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SUMMARY 
Computer and networking technology on board ships is increasing in complexity as the levels of automation and 
monitoring at sea evolve. Ships are acknowledged to be a System of systems, including both IT (Information 
Technology) and OT (Operational technology). A virtual team that includes members of the various on-board 
departments, shore based technical support staff and vendors perform management of technical equipment, largely in 
isolation. It is possible to conclude that the technology installation is one of the only operational aspects of a vessel, 
where no one has the full picture and could drive a coordinated response to a major technology issue. This paper will 
propose a best practice framework for governance of technology on board ships. This framework will serve as an input 
to the process of including cyber security in the ISM Safety Management Manual for the 2021 deadline. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The increasing growth of Information Technology (IT) 
and Operational technology (OT) on board sea going 
vessels is a response to the environment of increasing 
competition and regulation in combination with a 
reduced complement of seafarers. This has resulted in a 
developing reliance on integrated technology systems for 
day-to-day ship board operations [11]. The use of 
technology also supports the expansion of shore based 
monitoring and control [15]. The use of shore based 
personnel to perform support functions for ship based 
technology is a growing trend in maritime technology 
management where the responsibility of operating and 
maintaining maritime systems resides with a ”virtual 
team” including members of the vessels crew, shore 
based operators and technology vendor staff. Achieving 
the goal of reliable technology in any field of endeavour 
requires well-designed solutions that are maintained 
according to good engineering practice with appropriate 
governance systems overseeing their operation. In many 
cases the management of technology on board ships 
could currently be characterised as being ad-hoc. The 
technical capability can be represented as a collection of 
islands of expertise/practice with little standardisation, 
making them worthwhile candidates for maturity uplift 
through the implementation of IT Service Management 
(ITSM) [5]. IT Service Management has been identified 
by [5] as a method for providing stronger alignment 
between technology and its consumers, improved service 
delivery and utilization of resources. 
Robust IT governance systems have demonstrated 
that it is possible to reduce the potential for operational 
failures in critical systems [7]. A failure of critical 
technology can endanger life, property and the 
environment. An example highlighted by [16] 
demonstrates a lack of cohesiveness between a virtual 
technology support team and consumers of the 
technology service placed a vessel at risk. In this case, a 
software patch was installed remotely by a service 
engineer who was unaware of the operational context of 
the vessel at that time. The vessel was the process of 
berthing and the install resulted in a system reboot that 
stopped the engine room ventilation system, and 
subsequently left the vessel without propulsion at a 
critical time while it was manoeuvring. 
Since the 1990s technology organisations have been 
using governance frameworks such as the IT 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [7] to provide significant 
benefits to their respective organisations through 
rigorous control of testing and system changes, resulting 
in more predictable infrastructure, reduced faults and 
consistent handling of technology incidents. 
Organisations who have adopted these technology 
service management frameworks enjoy cost effective 
services, reduced downtime, improved security and 
higher customer satisfaction [5]. This paper will discuss 
the potential for increasing the maturity of technology 
service provision on sea going vessels through the use of 
an IT governance framework. 
2 MARITIME TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 
MANAGEMENT AND ITS CHALLENGES 
While there are currently many technology companies 
providing shipboard solutions to the maritime industry, 
historically the industry has lagged behind other shore 
based industries in adoption and governance of new 
technologies. The global focus on cyber security over the 
last few years has led to activity in the development of 
guidance and regulation. This includes the IMO releasing 
requirements for management of cyber risk [9], and 
various other maritime organisations releasing technical 
papers and guidelines - [3], LR [14], DNV [6]. There are 
also a number of standards being developed that address 
maritime technology, The International Standards 
Organisation is currently drafting ISO-19847 and ISO-
19848, specifying minimum standards for on-board 
computing and communications. Despite these recent 
efforts, the overall current maturity of IT service 
provision is low, and time and commitment are required 
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from stakeholders to reach a suitable level. The following 
sections discuss some of the challenges ahead. 
Technology management on sea going vessels can be 
described as having a relatively low level of 
maturity.  Two well-known aspects of this are software 
quality [2] and cyber security [9]. These challenges are 
symptoms of a unique and complex operating 
environment that often features different stakeholders 
managing parts of the technology infrastructure in 
isolation. Company technologists, seafarers and vendors 
all participate in supporting and operating the specialised 
equipment that is installed on-board.  There are however 
few, if any, processes around over-arching technology 
governance. 
A new vessel entering service is designed for an 
operational lifespan of 25 years [8]. Technology systems, 
both hardware and software are supported by their 
respective vendors for only short period of time relative 
to the lifespan of a ship. Once hardware and software 
reaches it’s ’end of support’ date, software and firmware 
upgrades are no longer provided reducing the reliability 
of the technology. Many vessels in the worldwide 
merchant fleet rely upon legacy hardware and software 
that is no longer supported by vendors, placing them at 
increased risk of technology failure. 
With respect to configuration management the 
nature of the technology installation is such that changes 
to installed software, hardware or configuration are 
typically made directly into the ’production’ system, as 
there is often no test network available that would allow 
for full validation of the change prior to implementation. 
This is a significant deviation from best practices used 
ashore when making changes to production [12]. 
2.1 COMMUNICATIONS 
Vessels travel around the globe and are often reachable 
only via low bandwidth / high cost satellite 
communications, limiting the opportunity for remote 
shore based technical support. Due to the limited 
physical access to systems the downloading of updates 
and patches increasingly needs to be performed remotely 
via a limited bandwidth connection [14]. The size and 
release frequency of software patches for operating 
systems alone may challenge the total bandwidth 
available to the vessel, resulting in patches not being 
installed when required. 
2.2 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The role of seafarers has changed significantly in recent 
decades, with automation playing an ever-increasing role 
in day-to-day operations. While this has increased 
efficiency, offering a steady reduction in the number of 
people required to operate a vessel, there are other trade-
offs that need to be considered, particularly in the context 
of a geographically distributed virtual team. The current 
generation of ships are inadvertently provided with 
remote team members performing tasks such as system 
monitoring, performance optimisation, software patch 
installs and in some cases system control [16]. 
Physical maintenance of technology systems is often 
performed in port by technicians that may not understand 
the history of the vessels systems and who will be 
operating under the vessels tight schedule, leaving 
limited time for testing and fine tuning of systems.  
Controlling and authorising changes made to 
technology either as configuration changes or software 
updates are critical to the reliability of the systems. 
Supporting this and equally important is the capability 
for centralised management of problems and incidents 
[5]. While developing these processes and artefacts may 
be seen as a significant outlay in time and resources, 
there are opportunities for return on investment where 
system downtime can be reduced or removed as a result. 
2.3 TEAMWORK 
Every team requires a number of elements to make it 
effective - a clearly understood shared purpose, 
leadership and defined roles for team members. [15] has 
identified that challenges currently exist within the 
virtual team due to the lack of a central point of 
oversight. Off-ship support staff may also be impacted by 
time zone differences. The effectiveness of a fragmented 
workforce must also be considered in maintenance / 
breakdown repair activities and most critically in 
response to an emergency situation. Where somewhat 
tenuous communications links are relied upon for team 
coordination, consideration must be given to process that 
defines actions that are taken in the event of loss of team 
communications. 
2.4 MANNING 
The manning levels needed to operate a vessel safely are 
defined through a process known as MSM (Minimum 
Safe Manning). This process requires consideration of 
risks associated with the sudden failure of critical 
equipment [15]. When consideration is given to the 
reduction of crew, the use of shore based resources as 
part of a virtual team and the increasing role of 
automation, it is necessary to ask whether it is realistic to 
revert to manual methods in the event of a broad failure 
of on-board technology. A scenario such as the Slammer 
Worm, that was released in 2003 has the potential to 
simultaneously impact multiple critical systems, as 
happened in the case of the Davis-Besse power plant in 
Oak Harbour, Ohio [4]. In the case of a virtual team, 
relying upon digital communications to collaborate, a 
broad technology failure may disrupt communications, 
resulting in additional challenges in resolving such an 
incident. 
2.5 SAFETY, SKILLS & TRAINING 
The use of remote support by vendors delivers significant 
benefits, as they are able to provide highly specialised 
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skills and utilise them across multiple vessels. The skills 
and training that exists within a team clearly impacts the 
ability of that team to work effectively. In the case of 
maritime technology systems, the strategies of relocation 
of skills to shore and the outsourcing of capabilities to 
external companies that provide the service remotely 
need to be monitored to ensure that the necessary skills 
are maintained within the broader team in a sustainable 
manner that transcends staff turnovers within service 
provider companies [16]. It is also necessary to 
determine how accountabilities that would have 
traditionally resided with licensed officers can be 
allocated to shore based organisations [15]. The resultant 
de-skilling of team members also needs to be considered. 
Automation has the potential to impact the ability for 
team members to perform effective problem solving 
when the automation fails. This is particularly 
problematic during emergency situations where manual 
tasks that would normally be performed by automation 
must be re-configured and shared across team members 
[15]. 
3 DISCUSSION 
The use of computing technology on ships has changed 
dramatically in recent years. There has been a transition 
from proprietary electronics to the use of general purpose 
computing infrastructure [10]. These systems have 
significantly different requirements for maintenance and 
governance. The following sections will discuss the 
desired changes to increase the maturity of technology 
governance.  
3.1 CHANGE OF PHILOSOPHY FOR 
TECHNOLOGY ON SHIPS 
Keeping technology systems operational includes 
ensuring that problems and incidents receive appropriate 
responses; user accounts and access permissions are 
managed; any changes to configuration or software 
upgrades are tested and authorised before being applied 
to the production systems; systems have sufficient 
capacity and are secured against cyber attack. Planning 
must also be performed to allow for continuity of 
operations in the event of a system failure that cannot 
immediately be resolved. This level of robust 
management of systems should be initiated at the start of 
a vessels life and be a constant until it is 
decommissioned. It may be necessary for the systems 
and processes to transition through a number of owners 
and management arrangements during that time so that 
the necessary technology governance can be maintained. 
To reach the target state of maturity and robustness, 
it is necessary to change the current philosophy of design 
and operation. Equivalent rigour should be applied to the 
technology infrastructure, as is found in other aspects of 
vessel operations. Examples include: the requirement for 
a ’technology log book’ that records significant events 
that are applicable to the technology systems, as has been 
required for deck and engine room operations throughout 
the history of shipping; applying a permit to work 
scheme for technology changes, requiring vessels to 
undergo periodic technology surveys and inclusion of 
technology systems in the planned maintenance schedule. 
3.2 FUTURE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
System design plays a key part of any robust 
technological system. When considering that the overall 
ship IT system must be operated and maintained by a 
virtual team, this requirement must be considered up 
front to ensure that appropriate collaboration and 
governance can occur throughout the full life-cycle of the 
systems from vessel concept to decommissioning [14]. 
The design of vessel systems must satisfy the needs for 
dependability and reliability and enable both onboard and 
remote operators to work safely, securely and collaborate 
effectively [15]. Also of critical importance is the 
requirement for fast recovery of a failed system to restore 
safety critical operations [11, p.9]. Any design (or 
modification) of a vessel’s technology during its service 
life needs to consider the full set of operational 
constraints of the technology services that are provided 
[13]. This may be documented as a set of ’use cases’ that 
detail the functional tasks that the system provides and 
shows which ’actors’ within the virtual team perform 
which tasks and any collaboration that is necessary 
between the actors should be specified. This philosophy 
may require modification to current practices of 
developing design specifications and commercial 
contracts [16]. 
3.3 THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY 
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 
As the policy maker for the maritime industry, the IMO 
has identified, through the release of their cyber risk 
management guidelines [9], that risk management for 
technology systems is fundamental to safe and secure 
shipping. By 2021 all vessels must include cyber risk 
management within their safety certificates. There is also 
an opportunity within the ISPS Code for future inclusion 
of digital systems and infrastructure within its safety 
management practices [1]. Lloyds Register has published 
a ShipRight procedure [14], endorsing a total system 
approach including consideration of the ship, 
communications links and off-ship facilities and services 
that could potentially compromise the safety or the 
capability of the vessel. This shows an increasing 
awareness and commitment from key industry 
organisation that needs to be broadened and translated 
into operational maturity and governance. 
The remediation plans outlined within the ISM and 
ISPS Codes are required to be reviewed annually, 
following an incident or after any changes to 
infrastructure. This ensures that the plans take into 
consideration the rapidly changing technological 
solutions offered to the industry. It also enforces the 
adaptability of these assessments, as a company must 
prove post-incident that risks are being mitigated. 
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The approach to providing a more robust technology 
environment which has been adopted in shore based 
industries is to implement enterprise capabilities that 
support the primary mission oriented systems. This 
approach works well within large enterprises, as it 
provides consistency and economies of scale such that 
specialist staff can be employed to provide these 
services. Using the example of software asset 
management [15], a large enterprise may deploy a 
dedicated system that monitors all other infrastructure 
and periodically gathers data on installed software 
packages and versions. This is a powerful tool, as it 
allows for centralised analytics, reporting and 
identification of non-compliant, vulnerable software. 
While this approach works well in this type of 
organisation, enterprise solutions typically require their 
own specialist resources, infrastructure and connectivity 
to the supported systems. Enterprise solutions also 
typically provide services such as identity and access 
management, configuration management, asset 
management and centralised management of a Standard 
Operating Environment (SOE) for desktops and Servers 
[4]. Maritime based technology operates on a mobile 
platform with limited connectivity and these 
arrangements may be challenging to implement in this 
context. 
IT Service Management has been identified by 
Cater-Steel, Toleman and Tan [5] as a method for 
providing additional rigour around IT services and 
reducing the level of ad-hoc operations. An IT Service 
Management framework such as the IT Infrastructure 
Library (ITIL) could be applied to the technology 
services that support operations on sea going vessels. At 
the tactical level, clear definitions of the various services 
being provided by technology and their criticality would 
provide a valuable starting point to stakeholders to 
understand the technology landscape and the roles that 
various team members perform in providing those 
services. An understanding of the current and projected 
capacities of the infrastructure and realistic plans for 
maintaining availability / service continuity would 
complement the service definitions, providing a 
governance view of the technology as a whole. 
3.4 THE VIRTUAL TEAM 
The challenge for the virtual team in maintaining sea 
going technology has many aspects. It includes 
collaborating with other team members across 
organisations and geographies, traversing diverse written 
and spoken languages to support technology 
infrastructure that is mobile, adding also the difficulties 
of uncertain connectivity, bandwidth and skills on-board 
and ashore. It is important to define how much 
technology work can be managed shore side and what 
will be done by seafarers, defining boundaries of 
responsibilities/ dynamics / communications between 
ship and shore. This is critical to ensure that trust is 
established between on ship and off ship team members 
to ensure that the needs of all the team members are 
being considered [16]. Moving to more robustly 
governed technology requires the establishment of 
system boundaries and clear roles / accountabilities 
(including for any systems hosted or managed ashore). 
These established boundaries will clearly define any 
remote connections from ship to shore. There is a need to 
evolve current management practices to include testing 
and authorisation of any changes to software or 
configuration, with roll-back capability in the event of 
failed changes [14]. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Technology has inevitably found its way onto sea going 
vessels in increasing ways. However, the importance of 
technology to the operation of the vessel is not 
represented in the culture of shipping at present. 
Accountability and ownership for technology is not 
clearly defined on board. Other critical operations on-
board such as navigation and propulsion have formal 
processes supporting them such as defined roles, 
accountabilities and the use of logbooks for recording 
events, the onboard technology is not operated with the 
same rigour. Similarly, the vessels maintenance program 
does not typically include details of technology hardware 
or software patches or software version updates that are 
required. 
Current practices employed for management of 
technology on sea going vessels has been described as 
ad-hoc, largely due to the inherent constraints of the 
operating environment. In addition to this, there is often a 
lack of technology governance or formally defined IT 
Service management applied to shipboard technology. 
Observations of the current industry technology strategy 
suggest that the levels of automation and the use of 
’virtual teams’ to support ship based technology will 
continue to grow. Ship based technology needs to be 
managed throughout the life-cycle of the vessel and 
therefore must be considered from the development of 
the concept, through signing of contracts, build and 
operation. As the industry moves toward remote operated 
systems and further reduction of crews, the governance 
of technology systems will become more critical, as there 
will be less opportunity for human intervention in the 
event of a failure of technology at sea. 
While there are significant upsides in providing 
shore based skills to support seafarers (such as sharing 
extremely specialised skills across a broad range of 
vessels) there are risks that need to be managed, 
including de-skilling of seafarers, and lack of ship to 
shore connectivity during an emergency making shore 
based support unavailable. The use of virtual teams also 
presents an organisational and management challenge 
due to the fact that the members may operate in different 
geographies, time-zones and organisations. To be 
successful any well organised team must have a 
structure, reporting lines and the necessary collaboration 
tools to ensure that they can achieve their common 
purpose of supporting the on-board technology systems. 
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The principles of good governance require that any 
changes made to technology should be authorised by an 
allocated system owner, who is accountable for the 
system and its reliable operation. 
The lifecycle of technology is much shorter than that 
of mechanically engineered systems such as a ship. 
While ships' main and auxiliary systems may be expected 
to last (with necessary maintenance) for the life of the 
vessel, technology system lifecycles are much shorter 
that other equipment on board. Technology requires not 
only regular maintenance but will also become redundant 
within a shorter timeframe, requiring technology refit to 
maintain reliable service. System design is critical when 
delivering technology systems that must be relied upon. 
Design does not simply refer to the technology. When 
considering the entirety of a ship based technology 
system and the virtual team supporting it the system 
boundary includes the team members that operate the 
system and all the enabling processes that occur to 
support the technology. 
Taking the opportunity to adopt a formal ITSM 
framework such as ITIL to provide governance over the 
critical technology service on vessels would lift the 
maturity of the technology services, providing 
accountability and a reduction in unplanned technology 
failures. 
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